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Executive summary 
Projections of the potential impact of climate change across different sectors and in dif-
ferent parts of the world are becoming more serious. Climate change impacts are likely 
to be felt especially by the weakest and most vulnerable people, who often have contrib-
uted least to changing the global atmosphere. As irreversible changes to the climate sys-
tem have been initiated by past (and future) emissions, the focus of international negotia-
tions is shifting from mitigation to new climate risks and adaptation to them. Financial 
resources to reduce the impacts of climate change through adaptation are, however, 
likely to fall considerably short of what is needed. 
Burden-sharing of adaptation costs to climate change has received limited attention in 
the scientific literature, and the principles applicable in sharing the burdens of mitigation 
efforts are not easily transferable to the problem of adaptation. In this report we establish 
a conceptual framework that identifies a set of principles that can serve as a basis for 
choices about how to share the burden of the costs of adaptation to climate change. 
Three basic principles are identified: deontology, solidarity and consequentialism. Deon-
tology implies that individuals and countries can be held responsible for their acts. It lies 
at the heart of principles in economics and law, including the Polluter Pays Principle and 
the No Harm Principle. The main message in practical terms for policy makers is that 
these principles imply that those responsible for the problem should also be responsible 
for dealing with them, practically or financially. However, the inter-temporal effects 
(emissions now may have effects many decades in the future) and attribution problems 
(establishing a causal link between a specific greenhouse gas emission and an experi-
enced effect of climate change is scientifically very difficult) associated with climate 
change impose major difficulties for a direct implementation of a Polluter Pays Principle. 
Given these problems, we argue that a liability principle may not be appropriate in the 
short run, and that states could use a less demanding, but also well-established notion of 
historical responsibility. The solidarity and consequentialism principles promote sharing 
burdens in a fair way, irrespective of the previous actions by different countries. Taking 
these insights together, the dimensions along which the practical and financial burdens of 
climate change impacts could be shared are then equality and capacity. We argue that 
equality is an unfeasible criterion for sharing adaptation costs, but that capacity is more 
promising. 
The main body of the report is concerned with assessing how these principles might be 
translated into practice. From a very wide range of possible parameters relevant to  
responsibility, equality and capacity of states, we choose a more limited set, representing 
these as scenarios. Quantitative results of applying these criteria and varying parameters 
are then presented for major world regions. For the historical responsibility scenarios it 
is clear that UNFCCC Annex I countries carry the greatest responsibility under most 
scenarios, but that the choice of values for key parameters does have a marked affect on 
outcomes. A number of common but differentiated responsibilities scenarios, combining 
responsibility and capacity criteria, were also evaluated. The analysis shows that out-
comes are relatively stable across scenarios, but differ substantially subject to the choice  
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of a criterion for defining Capacity to Pay. We find that the contribution of The Nether-
lands to financing adaptation would lie between 0.6% and 1.3% of total global adapta-
tion costs, depending on the policy scenario chosen. Assuming costs of climate adaptation 
is $100 billion per year (UNDP, 2007), the total financial contribution by The Netherlands 
could range between $600-1300 million per year, depending on the principles and parame-
ters chosen. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Adaptation to climate change 
It is more than a century and a half since the first scientific recognition of climate change 
and only thirty years since the global scientific community first met to discuss its chal-
lenges in 1979 at the World Climate Conference. It took another ten years before nego-
tiations to address the problem were initiated in 1990. Yet globally we are still emitting 
greenhouse gases in increasing amounts (IPCC, 2007: 2). 
Meanwhile, the prognosis regarding the potential impact of climate change across differ-
ent sectors and in different parts of the world is becoming more serious. The fourth  
assessment report of the IPCC states that “Observational evidence from all continents 
and most oceans shows that many natural systems are being affected by regional climate 
changes, particularly temperature increases” (IPCC, 2007: 2). 
Furthermore, the impacts are likely to be felt most by the weakest and most vulnerable 
people, who often contributed least to the cause of the problem (Paavola and Adger, 
2006). Financial resources to reduce the impacts of climate change through adaptation 
are likely to fall considerably short of what is needed. Current estimates of the required 
resources are as high as US $50 billion annually (Oxfam International, 2007) and range 
up to US $100 billion annually (UNDP, 2007). 
At the UN Climate Conference in Bali in 2007 much debate centred on the issues of  
liability and equity, with many developing countries calling on the developed world – 
those primarily responsible for most greenhouse gas emissions – to fully engage in the 
transfer of technologies and funds to help mitigate and adapt to climate change. 
1.2 International financing of adaptation as part of a PPP-based policy 
The international financing of adaptation efforts raises many relevant questions in terms 
of burden-sharing, such as who is responsible for causing the climate change problem; 
who should be held liable for damages that will occur or are already occurring; what 
would be a fair division of financing obligations, and what is the capacity of different  
regions to contribute to international financing? It is clear that any meaningful answer to 
these questions needs to draw on the insights from political, legal, natural science and 
economic perspectives and needs to pass certain ethical considerations. One major com-
plication in combining these insights is the difference in terminology, which may easily 
lead to misunderstandings in trans-disciplinary communication. Grasso (2007) points out 
that the ethical considerations related to burden-sharing of adaptation costs have received 
limited attention relative to sharing the burdens of mitigation1. 
Thus, it becomes important to establish a conceptual framework for assessing responsi-
bilities for international financing of adaptation related to climate change. A key princi-
ple of domestic environmental policy is the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) adopted by 
                                                   
1  In fact, Ringius et al. (2002a) is one of the few reports that, through their “second fairness 
framework”, treats adaptation, damage and mitigation costs as a basis for burden sharing. 
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OECD countries. In the words of the OECD (1972): “the polluter should bear the  
expenses of carrying out the pollution prevention and control measures […] to ensure 
that the environment is in an acceptable state”. This principle assumes that victims of 
pollution have a right to a certain acceptable state of the environment. Polluters must pay 
for measures that ensure that the environment returns to (or remains in) this acceptable 
state. For instance, the emissions of greenhouse gases that cause climate change should 
be priced at such a level that dangerous climate change is avoided, or differently put, the 
external cost of emissions should be internalised. In case the environment cannot be  
returned to an acceptable state, as is the case for climate change impacts, the main idea 
of the PPP may be expanded, so that the polluter also bears responsibility for damage, 
knowingly or unknowingly caused. 
Climate policy consists of three main pillars: (i) mitigate emissions to reduce future cli-
mate impacts; (ii) use carbon sinks and Carbon Capture and Storage to avoid climate  
impacts from emissions that do take place; and (iii) invest in adaptation to minimize (or 
in extreme cases even eliminate) the unavoidable negative impacts of climate change. 
The PPP justifies such a climate policy in an international context, as it implies that pol-
luters should undertake action on each of these three pillars and should bear the financial 
consequences. The focus of this report is on the third pillar of climate policy: investing 
in adaptation. In particular, we investigate how to design an international framework for 
financing adaptation that is in line with the PPP. 
Establishing ‘environmental liability’ and designing compensation principles and 
mechanisms for climate change is a complex task that will need to draw on legal and 
ethical precedents in other fields, such as international law and consumer protection. 
These mechanisms may not directly draw on the Polluter Pays Principle, it is clear that 
they are intrinsically linked to each other. For example, one of the fundamental princi-
ples in international law is sovereignty, subject to the principle of not causing harm to 
others, and where such harm is caused – to provide compensation and redress the harm 
through injunctive relief. 
While the basic assumptions of PPP and liability are clear, it is not straightforward how 
these principles can be used to assess the responsibilities of specific regions for interna-
tional financing of adaptation. This study addresses this issue by making such general 
principles applicable in the context of climate change. We start by analysing the litera-
ture from different disciplinary perspectives for the most important basic ethical (or phi-
losophical) principles that can be used to determine the responsibilities of countries. 
Then we investigate how these principles can be used to specify some practical policy 
guidelines, offering practical considerations and suggestions for policy makers. The 
main aim of the study is to provide a limited set of “images” that can be used by the 
Dutch government to establish a position on the financing of international adaptation to 
climate change. Finally, we investigate how these discussions may evolve and what 
these guidelines may mean to specific countries and regions, including the Netherlands. 
1.3 Responsibilities and contributions to climate change 
The contribution of different countries to climate change is one of the key aspects of  
establishing responsibilities of countries for adaptation funding as part of a PPP-based 
policy. It is, however, difficult to disentangle historical and current contributions,  
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because historical emissions may have long lasting effects on climate conditions in the 
future for two main reasons. 
First, the atmospheric lifetime of most greenhouse gases is (very) long (Montenegro et 
al., 2007). Climate simulations by Matthews and Caldeira (2008) suggest that “any  
future anthropogenic emissions will commit the climate system to warming that is essen-
tially irreversible on centennial timescales”. Second, lags in the climate system imply 
that past emissions continue to change the climate in the future as a result of effects not 
directly related to the long lifetime of greenhouse gases (IPCC, 2007). For example, heat 
transports slowly into the deep ocean so that thermal expansion causes sea levels to rise 
for a long time in response to an increase in surface temperature. 
Figure 1.1 illustrates these issues by showing how the cumulative stock of anthropogenic 
CO2 emissions from various historical time periods contributes to the components of the 
cause-effect chain of climate change, i.e. the enhancement in total CO2 concentration 
(compared to pre-industrial levels), radiative forcing and temperature increase. It should 
be noted here that there remains considerable scientific uncertainty concerning the exact 
relations in this cause-effect chain, for instance in the relationship between atmospheric 
concentrations of greenhouse gases and long-term changes in mean global surface tem-
peratures (see Section 3.2 and Appendix I). 
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Figure 1.1 Historical emissions of CO2 only and its impacts on concentrations, radia-
tive forcing and temperature change using the MATCH climate model (see  
Appendix I). Individual curves represent contributions of emissions from  
different start dates (1750 to 2000). Source: den Elzen et al. (2005a). 
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Due to these intertemporal effects of emissions and the changes they cause in the Earth 
System, it is unlikely that studies of the historical contribution to climate change capture 
all future impacts of emissions, unless evaluation dates extend very far into the future. A 
related issue is that several studies indicate that abrupt changes in climate may occur 
once greenhouse gas concentrations cross certain thresholds (Alley et al., 2003). 
This difficulty of identifying and disentangling historical and current contributions could 
be an important complicating factor in the allocation of responsibilities between coun-
tries and regions. At this moment the industrialized countries, notably Europe, USA,  
Japan and Russia, carry the main responsibility for past human contributions to atmos-
pheric greenhouse gas concentrations (den Elzen et al., 2005b; Srinivasan et al., 2008). 
For this reason, many developing countries have argued that they should not be penal-
ized for historical emissions by the rich countries (Najam et al., 2003). However, it 
should be noted that relative contributions to the climate problem are changing, notably 
due to the rapid industrialization of China and to a lesser extent India and other develop-
ing countries. Therefore, in the future the responsibility for the climate problem will be 
shared by the historically large emitters, as well as rapidly developing countries (Botzen 
et al., 2008). The next section will look closer at these changing emission patterns. 
Another issue open for debate is the extent to which countries are still responsible for 
climate impacts that are caused by emissions that occurred before there was scientific 
consensus about anthropogenic causes of climate change, or which occurred during a  
period after the creation of an international climate regime (say the coming into force of 
the Kyoto Protocol). Höhne et al. (2008) conclude that it is very likely that the element 
of historical responsibility will play a role in the design of a future agreement. It is, how-
ever, unlikely that it will be the only parameter used for sharing emission reductions be-
tween countries. 
1.4 Changing emission patterns and responsibilities 
In 2007 China surpassed the USA in total annual CO2 emissions (please see 
http://www.mnp.nl/en/dossiers/Climatechange/moreinfo/Chinanowno1inCO2emissions
USAinsecondposition.html). Economic development and growth in industrializing coun-
tries will increase their demand for energy and result in higher growth of greenhouse gas 
emissions. Therefore, the responsibility for the climate problem will shift gradually to 
these large rapidly developing countries in the future. Botzen et al. (2008) examine this 
issue and project cumulative CO2 emissions from fossil fuels for Western Europe, the 
USA, Japan, China and India. Cumulative CO2 emissions were taken as an approxima-
tion of the degree of responsibility for human-induced climate change. Botzen et al. 
show that the rapid industrialization of countries, such as China and India, is expected to 
change relative contributions of countries to climate change in the coming decades. This 
shows that computations of the contributions of countries to global warming will need 
continuous revision over time, as will an assessment of their responsibility. Botzen et al. 
also conclude that international arrangements for financing adaptation need to be flexible 
so agreements can adjust to changes in the relative contribution to climate change by dif-
ferent countries. 
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1.5 The Brazilian proposal on countries’ contributions to climate change 
Although difficult, some attempts have been made to use historical responsibility for  
assessing the contributions of countries to international climate change financing mecha-
nisms. The “Brazilian proposal” was the first and most influential of these attempts. In 
1997, Brazil proposed a method to calculate contributions of emission sources to climate 
change (FCCC/AGBM/1997/MISC.1/Add.3) (UNFCCC, 1997). Although the original 
application to emissions reduction targets was not pursued, continued interest in the  
scientific and methodological aspects of the proposal by Brazil led to a series of expert 
meetings (reported in FCCC/SBSTA/2001/INF.2), followed by a model inter-compa-
rison exercise on the “Attribution of Contributions to Climate Change” (from which 
some results were reported in FCCC/SBSTA/2002/INF.14). The conclusions of this 
analysis are described in UNFCCC (2002), and some institutes have reported their analy-
sis in more detail (e.g., den Elzen et al., 2002a; Andronova and Schlesinger, 2004; Höh-
ne and Blok, 2005; den Elzen et al., 2005b; Trudinger and Enting, 2005). 
The SBSTA, at its seventeenth session, agreed that work on the scientific and methodo-
logical aspects of the proposal by Brazil should be continued by the scientific commu-
nity, in particular to improve the robustness of the preliminary results and to explore the 
uncertainty and sensitivity of the results to different assumptions. 
(FCCC/SBSTA/2002/13, paragraphs 28-30). Subsequent to this agreement the govern-
ments of UK, Brazil and Germany took the initiative to organize an expert meeting in 
September 2003 that formed the Ad Hoc Group on Modelling and Assessment of Con-
tributions to Climate Change (MATCH). 
Encouraged by the mandate of the SBSTA, the aim of MATCH has been “...to evaluate 
and improve the robustness of calculations of contributions to climate change due to spe-
cific emissions sources, building on the proposal by Brazil, and to explore the uncer-
tainty and sensitivity of the results to different assumptions.” The aim is to provide guid-
ance on the implications of the use of the different scientific methods, models, and 
methodological choices. Where scientific consensus allowed, the group would recom-
mend one method/model/choice or several possible methods/models/choices for each 
step of the calculation of contributions to climate change, taking into account scientific 
robustness, practicality and data availability. Outputs of the group are primarily articles 
for the peer-reviewed scientific literature (see http://www.match-info.net/ for all papers 
and meeting reports). 
1.6 Existing compensation schemes for damage and adaptation costs 
Several international bodies have developed funds to assist developing countries in pay-
ing for the costs of adaptation related to the negative (or positive) impacts of climate 
change. The main aim of these funds is to transfer wealth from developed to developing 
countries in order to compensate for the heavy burden climate change puts on developing 
countries. None of the existing funds rely on the notion of historical responsibility in  
determining the level of national contributions to these funds. Instead all funds, except 
the international Adaptation Fund established under the Kyoto protocol, are based on 
‘conventional’ funding methods that underpin assessments of financial contributions to 
the United Nations and overseas development assistance, including related grants and 
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loans (Müller, 2008). Hence, a clear relationship with the PPP has not yet been estab-
lished. We will set out briefly the main existing funding mechanisms. 
Under the Kyoto protocol the signatory countries decided to form an international Adap-
tation Fund, such that signatory developing countries can finance concrete adaptation 
projects and programmes. Funds are raised partly through 2% proceeds from certified 
emission reductions under the clean development mechanism. However, other sources of 
funding are required and the linkage to trade in certified emission reductions puts great 
uncertainty on the size of funds available. At the UNFCCC conference in Bali (Decem-
ber 2007), it was decided that the adaptation fund will be managed by the Global Envi-
ronmental Facility and the World Bank will act as banker. 
The Global Environmental Facility is also the entity managing two other UNFCCC 
funds, (i) the Least Developed Countries Fund supports LDCs in preparing and imple-
menting National Adaptation Programmes of Action; and (ii) the Special Climate 
Change Fund was established to finance projects targeted mainly at studies, as well as 
demonstration and pilot projects, on adaptation planning and assessment. In fact, the 
Global Environmental Facility also adopted the Strategic Priority on Adaptation provid-
ing funds to implement adaptation pilots. Funding relies on voluntary contributions, with 
additional funds needing to be raised through overseas development assistance and 
loans. 
The World Bank is also active in financing adaptation in other forms than through the  
international Adaptation Fund. The Strategic Climate Fund aims at increasing climate 
resilience in developing countries to climate change and is supposed to be aligned with 
the international Adaptation Fund. Funds are provided in the form of loans to developing 
countries. 
Müller (2008) highlights that the main critique on ‘conventional’ funding methods origi-
nates from the fact that the donating countries decide what happens with the money, 
while it is the developing countries that experience the damage caused by polluting 
countries, often the major donors. In fact, by providing loans, developing countries  
create new debts to donor-polluter countries. Furthermore, the voluntary nature of the 
contributions contradicts the essence of the Polluter Pays Principle. 
Other, more innovative mechanisms to generate international funds for adaptation are 
currently being proposed; an analysis of these proposals is, however, beyond the scope 
of the current report. 
1.7 Research question 
Against this background, this report aims to address the question: 
What are the issues of relevance in using the polluter pays principle, in conjunction with 
liability and compensation principles, to develop a fair position on the responsibility of 
specific (groups of) countries, and especially the Netherlands, for adaptation to human-
induced climate impacts? 
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Specifically: 
1. What does the literature say about how the polluter pays principle, and liability and 
compensation principles, should be interpreted in relation to the climate change prob-
lem and in relation to allocating responsibility to individual countries? 
2. How can we translate these arguments and positions into a practical set of  
approaches, focusing, inter alia, on a possible cut-off date for assessing responsibility 
for past emissions, ethical principles for determining responsibility (e.g. per capita; 
gross emissions), and responsibilities for the future? 
3. What does this imply for the Netherlands’ position in international negotiations? 
4. Can the international division of responsibilities, as laid out in the practical set of  
approaches addressed in research questions 2 and 3, be quantified through an  
(approximate) assessment of historical emissions and the associated contributions to 
climate change? 
1.8 Focus and limits 
It should be stressed that this assessment is a preliminary review of the responsibilities 
for climate change in relation to the PPP for the Netherlands. It does not focus on: (a) the 
liability of individuals and companies; (b) to whom compensation should be paid and 
how; and (c) the mechanisms by which international payments can be made (funding,  
insurance and compensation schemes). 
The review is anchored in the international law and economics literatures, not in the 
study of ethics per se. Rather, the current project limits itself to providing a conceptual 
(but practical) framework that may form the basis for designing a position in interna-
tional climate policy on the international financing of adaptation efforts, as part of a 
broader PPP-based policy. It further briefly sketches international responsibilities, focus-
ing on the role of the Netherlands, and on some quantitative insights into the interna-
tional division of these responsibilities. 
1.9 This report 
This report is structured as follows. Chapter 2 establishes the ethical and other principles 
that can be used to consistently assess countries’ contributions to climate change. It  
develops three main principles that can be used to develop a policy that is fair. These 
three ethical and legal principles are translated in Chapter 3 into three principles (respon-
sibility, equality and capacity) that could underpin policy. It further highlights the main 
policy choices that need to be addressed in order to establish contributions of countries. 
Chapter 4 provides a quantitative analysis of applying alternative choices in allocating 
responsibility for global climate change and its impacts. In particular, we are interested 
in the international division of contributions to climate change. Chapter 5 concludes. 
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2. Ethical and other principles 
2.1 Introduction 
It is widely accepted that the distribution of adaptation costs among individual countries 
should be based on an underlying principle of fairness. Several such principles have been 
suggested from disciplines ranging from philosophy and ethics to international relations, 
law and economics. As a result of partial overlaps in terminology and meaning this is a 
potentially confusing area. Therefore, this chapter tries to structure the discussion by 
providing an overview of relevant concepts identified in the literature, while making the 
boundaries of their validity and origins explicit. 
Using equity (“fairness” in the economic sense) as the starting point, several guiding 
principles are at hand to distribute the costs among countries. Ikeme (2003) presents an 
important distinction between deontological and consequential justifications. Bouwer 
and Vellinga (2005) further point to the role of solidarity as a guiding principle. These 
are labelled in Table 2.1 as ethical principles. Table 2.1 shows that these ethical princi-
ples can be translated into principles that form the basis of policy choices. Each of these 
so-called ‘policy principles’, which are based on the classification by Heyward (2007), 
in turn implies a set of specific policy choices that should be made. These specific policy 
choices will be described in the next chapter. The combination of all three policy princi-
ples results in an assessment of ‘Common But Differentiated Responsibilities’ (CBDR), 
which can function as a pragmatic basis for developing proposals. Before going into this 
in Chapter 3, we will first explain the foundations of the ethical principles in this chapter. 
Table 2.1 Structure of the approach with corresponding section numbers. 
   2.1 Equity/fairness   
      
Ethical 2.2 Deontology  2.3 Solidarity  2.4 Consequentialism 
      
Policy 3.2 Responsibility  3.4 Equality  3.4 Capacity 
      
Pragmatic   3.5 CBDR assessment   
 
2.2 Deontology 
The deontological principle has some old and respectable philosophical and ethical roots. 
Ikeme (2003), Low and Gleeson (1998) and others trace the principle back to the phi-
losopher Emanuel Kant. Kant combined three arguments in his moral philosophy. His 
first premise is that all humans are equal in the sense that they experience happiness and 
suffering alike. His second premise holds that people are rational in the sense that they 
can take account of the consequences of their own actions for others. After all, those 
consequences are experienced equally. And his third premise is that people are free to 
choose their actions. From these arguments, Kant reasons that people can and should be 
held responsible for the consequences of their actions. 
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Several recent approaches to justify a distribution of costs of negative environmental 
consequences, have adopted the foundations of the deontological principle (see for  
example Cullet, 2007; Faure and Nollkaemper, 2007). The No Harm principle uses it in 
an international and legal context, the Polluter Pays Principle starts from an economic 
point of view and the Precautionary Principle looks mainly at the duties of states. 
2.2.1 No Harm Principle 
In international law the No Harm Principle has been adopted to signify that sovereign 
states can use their territory in whatever manner they want to, but they cannot cause 
harm to other states. When transboundary environmental problems became evident, the 
restricted territorial sovereignty principle led to the development of the principle of sov-
ereignty becoming subject to duty towards other states. This implied that states had 
complete control over their natural resources, but had the responsibility to ensure that 
they did not cause environmental harm to other states. As Tol and Verheyen (2004)  
explain, the principle further implies that when harm is done, causing states are obliged 
to redress or compensate the damage. 
This principle is deeply rooted. At Stockholm in 1972, the Declaration on the Human 
Environment stated that: 
“ States have in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the princi-
ples of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pur-
suant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the envi-
ronment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.” 
Stockholm Declaration 1972: Principle 21 
In several principles of the Rio Declaration (1992), the environment is represented as a 
global resource, for which all states have a common responsibility to protect. With this, 
according to Birnie and Boyle (2002), the declaration broke with earlier tradition in in-
ternational law where only state responsibilities for the national and transboundary envi-
ronment are set. “For the first time, the Rio instruments set out a framework of global 
environmental responsibilities” (Birnie and Boyle, 2002: 97). In 1992 in Rio, during the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, the No Harm Principle 
was once again emphasised in Principle 2. Since then, this principle has been included in 
many international environmental treaties, including the UNFCCC. In the convention 
text it is stated that states have the “responsibility to ensure that activities within their ju-
risdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction” (UNFCCC 1992). 
In the literature, attention has been paid to the difficulties and drawbacks of the No Harm 
Principle. The difficulty of linking damage at one place to polluting activities in another 
place, especially in the case of climate change where polluters are spread all over the 
world, is raised by several authors (Birnie and Boyle, 2002; Faure et al., 2007; Voigt, 
2008). Drumbl (2008: 10) furthermore points out that for harm that is “too indirect,  
remote, and uncertain” causation cannot be established and therefore “falls outside the 
scope of the reparative obligation”. This is a result of the jurisprudence on the Trail 
Smelter case, where the judges ruled that part of the alleged harm that the Canadian trail 
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smelter had caused to some areas in the U.S. fell into the ’indirect and uncertain’ cate-
gory and thus fell outside Canada’s duty to repair. Tol and Verheyen (2004) on the other 
hand argue that in the past it was possible to bring in a claim against only one state while 
several states were at the cause. Another complexity that is frequently pointed to is the 
question what actor can be held responsible: states, operators or consumers? States as 
such are not emitters of greenhouse gases, even if they may have the powers to regulate 
such emissions (see for example Faure et al., 2007; Cullet, 2007). It is important to note 
that the No Harm Principle as a legal liability principle has been proposed as the basis to 
sue countries for damages. This does not address their moral responsibility to limit dam-
ages or to provide compensation for damages unavoidably caused. The feasibility of this 
approach with respect to climate change has been the subject of much debate in the lit-
erature, see for example Allen (2003). 
2.2.2 Polluter Pays Principle 
The Rio Declaration also called on states to adopt the Polluter Pays Principle in domestic 
law. This principle can be traced back to OECD (1972), as noted in section 1.2, and can 
be used as a starting point for establishing international responsibility, c.q. liability and 
compensation rules. As past and current emitters together contribute to increasing envi-
ronmental risks caused by climate change, the emissions of greenhouse gases should be 
priced such that they can compensate affected countries to reduce their environmental 
risks and related impacts to an acceptable level. The PPP is incorporated in The Treaty 
Establishing the European Community (July 1st 1987, Article 174(2)) as one of the four 
leading principles that environmental policy should be based on, and it was introduced in 
the Single European Act (1987). 
Multiple problems complicate a direct application of the PPP to climate change. Stern 
(2007) labels climate change as an intergenerational and international externality, which 
is far more complex to deal with than other forms of pollution. Defining the polluter and 
the victim will be difficult enough in the present day. But establishing these for the past, 
as well as in the future, let alone developing a context in which there can be something 
meaningfully recognised as bargaining between polluters and victims across the space of 
decades and centuries, also raises obvious conceptual and practical problems. 
The primary concern of the PPP, from an economic perspective, is that the negative side 
effects of emissions are internalized by the polluters in such a way that the expected 
damages are included in profit and utility functions. Taxes, (tradable) property rights, 
quota and technological requirements are at hand for policy makers to achieve this inter-
nalization of damages (Perman et al., 2003). In particular the Coasian approach through 
private bargaining (between polluters) suggests emissions abatements should be 
achieved in places with lowest abatement and transaction costs. Hence, applications and 
discussions on the PPP are most often focused on efficiency discussions (Shukla, 1999). 
Knox (2002) highlights that relevant international laws and central authorities are lack-
ing to identify the polluter and secure the enforcement of burden-sharing schemes. Fur-
thermore, states disagree on which state has the right to pollute and which is entitled to 
clean resources (Barrett, 1996). Scientific uncertainties regarding the causes and impacts 
of climate change would even further complicate an application of PPP for climate 
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change in making specific polluters liable by proving causality (Franck, 1995; Seymour 
et al., 1992). 
We may conclude that PPP under certain conditions may lead to an (economically) effi-
cient solution to the externality; however, many obstacles prevent an application of the 
principle to climate change. Recent attempts to apply PPP and liability schemes to cli-
mate change have only been restricted to assigning property rights to reductions in emis-
sions (such as in emissions trading) and neglect the historical responsibility issue(Tol 
and Verheyen, 2004; Tol, 2006). Even if an application of PPP can be designed that 
takes into account the intergenerational and international aspect of climate change, then 
it also needs to be flexible. Efficiency2 considerations do, however, not take into account 
fairness of changes in wealth distribution. To come to an international agreement all 
players need to consider the burden-sharing and mitigation scheme as fair. Hence, equity 
issues play a more important role in international negotiations (Fischhendler, 2007; Rose 
et al., 1998). 
2.2.3 Precautionary Principle 
Trouwborst (2007) describes three main characteristics of the precautionary principle. 
First, there must be a “threat of environmental harm” (Trouwborst, 2007: 187). Second, 
because the environmental system is complex, there is always a degree of uncertainty 
connected to the threat of harm: the exact impacts cannot be calculated. According to the 
Precautionary Principle, however, this uncertainty is no excuse for non-action. The third 
characteristic holds that action must be taken “at a moment which is early enough to pre-
vent unacceptable environmental damage” (Trouwborst, 2007: 187), and that when there 
is uncertainty relating to the impacts, the environment should get the benefit of the 
doubt. The Precautionary Principle is included in principle 15 of the Rio Declaration. 
Furthermore, the Precautionary Principle is incorporated in The Treaty Establishing the 
European Community (Article 174(2)), where it was introduced in the Treaty of Maas-
tricht (1992) as a leading principle. Its background and a dozen case studies have been 
described in detail by the European Environment Agency (Gee and Vaz, 2001). The 
UNFCCC also adopted the principle. Article 3.3 of the convention states that “The Par-
ties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of 
climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or  
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for 
postponing such measures” (UNFCCC 1992). 
Due diligence is a central theme in the Precautionary Principle. As Rao (2002) explains, 
due diligence means a state should do everything within its capabilities to take measures 
that are “appropriate and proportional to the degree of risk of transboundary harm” 
(p. 27). This implies that to determine whether a state has acted with due diligence, two 
factors should be taken into account: First, its capabilities to act – i.e. its economic level; 
and second, the degree to which the harm could or should have been foreseen by the 
state (Voigt, 2008). The first factor thus adds to CBDR by making a distinction between 
the responsibilities of states. The second factor holds that the state is no “absolute guar-
antor of the prevention of harm” (Birnie and Boyle, 2002: 112). In the UNFCCC, the due 
                                                   
2 Please note this is economic terminology meaning: no resources should be wasted. 
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diligence principle is connected to the Precautionary Principle. States should act accord-
ing to the Precautionary Principle, but “policies and measures to deal with climate 
change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible 
cost. To achieve this, such policies and measures should take into account different 
socio-economic contexts” (UNFCCC 1992). 
 
The duty to act with due diligence and in accordance to the precautionary approach is 
laid down in different parts of international treaties, declarations and law. As a result, 
states can be called to account for not living up to these obligations. This has happened 
in several international court cases. In the 1995 ‘Request for an Examination of the situa-
tion’ (New Zealand v. France) for example, judges used the precautionary principle 
when stating that France is obliged to perform an Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA) to show that there are no detrimental consequences resulting from their under-
ground nuclear testing in the Pacific (Birnie and Boyle, 2002). Although in such cases 
non-compliance with due diligence or the precautionary principle was established, a 
number of difficulties with applying the principle in international law are identified in 
the literature. Voigt (2008) and Birnie and Boyle (2002) both argue that due diligence 
and the precautionary principle are ill-defined in international law and their interpreta-
tion can differ from court to court. In fact, the US and EU interpretations of the precau-
tionary principle contrasts markedly, as can be seen from their attitudes towards geneti-
cally modified food (Gaskell et al., 1999). In fact, these basic differences in legal  
approaches have been established in detail for liability for damage to public natural  
resources (Von Meijenfeldt and Schippers, 1990; Brans, 2001). 
2.3 Solidarity 
Bouwer and Vellinga (2005) point to solidarity as a guiding principle. There are many 
social and international public goods for which the solidarity principle holds. For in-
stance, it is the duty of all citizens equally to uphold the law, or to refrain from contra-
vening the law. Likewise, in international law, every state equally has a duty to uphold 
certain human rights or rules of war, without exception. Ringius et al. (2002b) argue that 
the most common starting point in (international) negotiations is that all parties have 
equal responsibilities to address the problem at hand. From a moral point of view, as 
Shue (1999) explains, the most just division of costs thinkable would be to share all costs 
equally among all parties. “What could possibly be fairer… than absolutely equal treat-
ment for everyone?” (Shue, 1999: 537). 
2.4 Consequentialism 
(Shue, 1999: 537) criticises the egalitarian approach. According to him, the problem is 
that the principle does not consider outcomes in terms of the relative consequences for 
different actors. For instance, if all states had to contribute equally to a global adaptation 
fund this could give rise to a situation in which some parties contribute such a large 
share of their national incomes that it compromises other necessary developmental  
expenditures. Another ethical principle underlying equity is therefore invoked – conse-
quentialism (Ikeme, 2003). 
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In practice, the consequentialist principle is often invoked. Consider the progressive 
taxation systems, for example. The rich pay a larger share of their income in taxes than 
the poor and therefore contribute relatively more to public funds. Rather than a flat rate 
in absolute terms, an equivalent degree of effort is assumed, with everybody contributing 
according to their capacity, i.e. the system is outcome-based. 
In the context of climate change and adaptation, consequentialism may also be a useful 
principle to apply if there are problems in identifying the polluter and the victim – as we 
have argued above. If there is an agreement on burden-sharing according to Capacity to 
Pay, then there is less need to go through the complex technical and political process of 
establishing responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions and for the damages that might 
result. Instead, the older and independent principle of Capacity to Pay would be invoked. 
2.5 Liability versus responsibility 
The distribution of adaptation costs among individual countries should be based on an 
underlying principle of fairness. Several fairness principles, deriving from disciplines 
ranging from philosophy and ethics to international relations, law and economics were 
reviewed in this chapter. Although legal principles are invariably based on underlying 
ethical and moral principles, this is potentially an extremely confusing area as a result of 
overlap in terminology and ambiguity of meanings. While some authors are of the opin-
ion that historical GHG emitting countries can successfully be subject to liability claims 
in an international context (Allen, 2003), a majority argue that the legal principles are ill-
defined and, therefore, the interpretation will differ from court to court (Birnie and 
Boyle, 2002; Brans, 2001; Voigt, 2008). 
With respect to the latter, three issues are important. First, the approach of liability in 
domestic law differs from country to country. For example, successfully suing the  
tobacco industry for health damage to smokers as has been done in the USA has failed 
elsewhere (e.g. in a Dutch court in December 2008). Second, domestic law and interna-
tional law are worlds apart. Many domestic liability issues do not have an equivalent un-
der international law and vice versa. Third, neither in domestic law, nor in international 
law, liability for climate change is a settled issue. For instance, establishing liability for 
climate risks associated with historic emissions would be difficult, as illustrated for  
industrial soil pollution in the Netherlands. Many industrial soil polluters were taken to 
court on charges of general liability (Von Meijenfeldt and Schippers, 1990). Very few 
were convicted, however, primarily because the law covering soil pollution was not  
established until many years after the soil pollution took place. Furthermore, there was 
often a lack of consensus on the precise date when the polluters should have been aware 
of the impacts. 
Although GHG emitting countries or companies may yet be taken to international or 
domestic courts on liability charges, the outcome is considered highly unpredictable 
(Farber, 2007; Faure et al., 2007). Furthermore, there are scientific uncertainties in estab-
lishing the causal chain from emissions of greenhouse gases to climate change damages. 
The IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC, 2007), for example, labels the chance that 
anthropogenic emissions lead to global climate change as “very likely”. The local and 
regional impacts of climate change are far more difficult to establish, because there are 
substantial problems in distinguishing between man-induced climate change and natural 
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climatic variability at these scales. This does not imply that a liability track should not be 
pursued. Rather, the currently proposed methodology can be considered an intermediary 
step that ensures that accountability is implemented as soon as possible, until a liability-
based approach becomes viable. 
Taking these aspects into account, we draw the conclusion that establishing international 
liability by suing for damages caused by climate change in domestic or international 
courts is currently very difficult and the outcomes would be highly uncertain. In our 
view, it may therefore be risky to employ a strict liability principle as the basis for an  
argument about the sharing of burdens of climate change impacts. 
Notwithstanding, the legal scope for liability compensation has been evolving for some 
time in the area of marine oil pollution (Mason, 2003) and legal progress in the area of 
climate change seems pending (Verheyen, 2005). The scientific uncertainties may also 
become smaller over time as research is able to build evidence for the causal chain  
between an emission and an impact and climate models become more reliable. These 
two developments may make the possibilities for international liability claims – or an in-
ternational liability protocol – more promising in the longer run. Therefore, it is essential 
that in the meanwhile better insight is gained into the major scientific and legal bottle-
necks in establishing an international liability context. 
We believe that the most reliable way to pursue compensation for climate change in the 
short run will be by establishing an international protocol. Evidently, the time required 
for international ratification would be considerable and the political feasibility of a 
global agreement may be limited (cf. the outcomes of the COP14 in Poznan, December 
2008). Such a protocol may be based on liability principles, but the related concept of 
historical responsibility can also be used as a basis. The two notions share the same ethi-
cal basis, and the outcomes of using the principles in terms of regional contributions to 
the international financing of adaptation are the same. Therefore, using the legal concept 
of liability may not even be necessary in the international political negotiations, espe-
cially given that policy makers want to make substantial progress in the short run. There-
fore, throughout the remainder of this report, rather than using the narrower concept of 
liability, we will use the broader notion of state historical responsibility. 
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3. From principles to a pragmatic policy 
3.1 Introduction 
The three underlying principles discussed in Chapter 2 can be transformed into three pol-
icy perspectives (pragmatic guiding principles), using the classification of Heyward 
(2007) as a starting point. First, an ethical and legal interpretation of what we have 
termed in Chapter 2 as the Deontontology Principle indicates that historical contributions 
to climate change can be used to assign Responsibility to individual countries. Second, 
the Solidarity Principle states that responsibilities should be divided equally, i.e. the  
approach should be based on Equality. Third, the Consequentialism Principle suggests 
that responsibilities should be based on the Capacity of countries to share the burdens of 
climate change. These three perspectives provide a legal and ethical framework through 
which contributions of countries to international financing of adaptation can be estab-
lished. For each perspective, a set of policy choices needs to be made in order to trans-
late the perspective into an operational framework. This chapter builds up towards this 
framework by identifying the set of policy choices that needs to be made and by evalu-
ating the justifications and consequences of particular choices based on the three per-
spectives in Sections 3.2 through 3.4, respectively. Finally, we set out an assessment of 
CBDRs that follows from an approach drawing on all three perspectives in Section 3.5. 
3.2 Responsibility 
The Treaty Establishing the European Community says the following on environmental 
policy (Article 174(2)): 
“...Community policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection 
taking into account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the 
Community. It shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the princi-
ples that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should 
as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay.” 
In other words, the EU emphasizes an application of the polluter pays principle and the 
precautionary principle with respect to environmental problems and highlights the  
responsibility of individual countries by rectifying the problem at the source. As past and 
current GHG emissions will irreversibly change environmental conditions these rectifi-
cations are best captured by a division of responsibilities based on historical contribu-
tions to the problem. Hence, this seems an excellent point of departure for a practical  
approach to establish historical responsibility for climate change. At this moment, taking 
historical responsibility into account means that OECD countries pay more because they 
have emitted more. 
Given the complexity of the problem of allocating historical responsibility for green-
house gases and their associated damage, and of estimating the costs of adaptation, we 
need to begin by clearly identifying the scientific and political options under discussion. 
This analysis build on Den Elzen et al. (2005a), with respect to both a set of primarily 
technical / scientific options (discussed further in Appendix I) and a set of primarily  
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policy options (presented in Table 3.1). Other important reference points in this discus-
sion are Den Elzen and Schaeffer (2002b), Trudinger and Enting (2005), Rive et al. 
(2006) and Müller (2008). 
In relating the effects of the two choice sets on the assessment of historical responsibili-
ties Den Elzen and Schaeffer (2002b) conclude that the “results for relative contributions 
to climate are found to be quite robust across a range of various simple models and  
scientific choices. Policy-related choices, such as time period of emissions, climate 
change indicator and gas mix, generally have larger influence on the results than scien-
tific choices”. Hence, the policy choices as described in Table 3.1 deserve a more elabo-
rate discussion. 
First, it is sometimes argued that a distinction should be made between emissions that 
serve a basic need, such as emissions for cooking and heating, and emissions that can be 
regarded as “luxury” (Müller et al., 2007). Accounting emissions on the basis of “full  
responsibility” attributes all emissions to individual countries, whereas limited responsi-
bility deducts a given amount of “basic allowances” and / or “subsistence allowances”. 
The latter refer to the set of needed emissions to survive and achieve some form of 
growth by developing countries, whereas the former represent a set of emissions which 
are harmless to the climate (Müller et al., 2007). 
Secondly, there is the question of whether emissions (and consequently climate impacts) 
should be attributed to the source of the emission or to the destination of the good or ser-
vice responsible for the emission, i.e. whether causal attribution should be to producers 
or consumers. It is customary to attribute emissions to the source; the UN Handbook on 
environmental accounting also adopts this custom. From an ethical perspective it may, 
however, make sense to attribute emissions to the final destination, i.e. to consumers. For 
instance, a large proportion of Chinese emissions are related to the production of goods 
consumed in OECD countries. Should these emissions be allocated to China or to the 
country where the good is consumed? Attributing emissions to consumers relies heavily 
on information on international trade flows, in order to link the sources and destinations 
of emissions that are embedded in produced goods. This makes it extremely hard to ap-
proximate emissions of specific regions and countries on a consumer-basis. 
Thirdly, concerning the gas mix taken into consideration, alternative choices can have 
major impacts on responsibility for individual countries. Since the pattern of industrial 
production differed across countries the share of individual countries in the emission of 
particular gases varies widely across gases. Furthermore, the inclusion of different sets 
of GHGs has other impacts on climate change across different climate models – an  
uncertainty represented in the range of ‘climate sensitivity’ still found in the literature 
(IPCC, 2007). Specific combinations of the choice of the start, end and evaluation dates 
may put a somewhat larger weight on short-lived greenhouse gases, for instance. 
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Table 3.1 Policy choices for establishing responsibilities. 
Issues Options Considerations/remarks 
Basic needs: • Full responsibility 
• Limited responsibility 
Limited responsibility assumes that harmless emis-
sion levels should not be included to determine re-
sponsibility 
Causal attribu-
tion: 
• Producer-based 
• Consumer-based 
 
Producer-based matches official emissions registra-
tion conventions. 
Difficulties in tracing back emissions to consumers. 
Greenhouse 
gas mix: 
 
• Fossil CO2 
• Total CO2 
• All Kyoto GHGs 
Different historical gas mixes across regions. 
Different GHGs have different residence times and 
effects on temperature increases. 
Kyoto GHGs are part of climate policies. 
Land-use 
change: 
• Include 
• Exclude 
Affects concentrations and absorptive capacities of 
the climate system. 
Indicator: 
 
• Radiative forcing 
• Cumulative emissions 
• Weighted concentrations 
• Temperature increase 
• Integrated temperature 
• Sea level rise 
• Damages 
Brazilian proposal suggests the use of temperature 
increase. 
Note that indicators that are more closely related to 
climate impacts/damages have a higher degree of 
uncertainty due to attribution issues. 
Damages could include indirect effects on economy 
but are very hard to estimate. 
Start date: 
 
• 1750 
• 1900 
• 1950 
• 1990 
• 2005 (“now”) 
There are shifts in emission concentrations over 
time between regions. 
Larger uncertainty in emission levels prior to 1950. 
Before 1900 even more uncertain 
1750 – start emission measuring; 1900 – start 
EDGAR database; 1950 – post World War II; 1990 
– climate change in negotiations (Kyoto Protocol) 
and first publication of IPCC Assessment report; 
2005 – the model used in our analysis includes 
emissions until 2005.  
End date: 
 
• 1990 
• 2000 
• 2005 (“now”) 
• 2050 
• 2100 
Shift in responsibilities between countries (expected 
growth in non-Annex I countries due to increasing 
emission levels). 
After 2005 combination of historical contribution 
and mitigation efforts, also requires the use of sce-
narios 
Evaluation 
date: 
 
• 2000 
• 2005 (“now”) 
• 2100 
• 2500 
Later evaluation date shifts attention to longer liv-
ing gases in the atmosphere. 
 
Fourth, concerning the climate change indicator selection, it should be noted that – like 
with any type of indicator – there is an obvious trade-off in accuracy in measurement 
(early in the cause-effect chain) versus accuracy in impact (late in the cause-effect 
chain), i.e. choosing temperature increase as indicator may be more accurate in terms of 
impact (although even then it is a proxy measure), but very uncertain in terms of meas-
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urement; while for cumulative emissions as indicator the opposite holds. For those indi-
cators that are not “forward-looking” (radiative forcing, temperature increase and sea-
level rise), a time gap between attribution end and evaluation dates enables delayed, but 
inevitable, effects of the attributed emissions to be taken into account. It therefore shifts 
the weight toward long-lived gases and towards more recent emissions (den Elzen et al., 
1999). An extreme choice as climate change indicator is the use of climate damages. The 
major advantage of using damages as climate change indicator is that it is the only indi-
cator that can potentially assess the indirect economic impacts of a climate change.  
Estimation of damages brings, however, further uncertainties that are an order of magni-
tude higher than for the other indicators due to the requirement that impacts due to  
anthropogenically-caused climatic changes are estimated and valued. Furthermore, the 
choice of the discount rate becomes relevant, which brings its own problems. 
Fifth, the most significant choice related to the choice of a greenhouse gas mix is the in-
clusion or exclusion of CO2 emissions from land use changes in addition to CO2 from 
fossil fuel emissions. In fact, the geographical spread of historic land use change emis-
sions differs substantially from the geographical spread of emissions from burning of 
fossil fuels. Including total (fossil and land-use change) CO2, N2O and CH4 emissions 
decreases the OECD share by 21 percentage points and increases the Asia share by 14% 
when compared with fossil fuel CO2 emissions alone. The effect of the remaining Kyoto 
greenhouse gases is in most cases negligible with respect to the chosen gas mix (den El-
zen et al., 1999). There are fundamental differences between emissions from the com-
bustion of fossil fuels and emissions from land use and land-use changes and forestry 
(LULUCF). Thus, it becomes a policy choice whether or not to include land use change 
emissions with substantial reductions in emissions allocated to OECD countries. Signifi-
cant measurement problems may arise when land use change emissions are included in 
the analysis. One especially sensitive issue could be the question of how to treat defores-
tation and land use change during periods of colonialism in parts of Asia, Africa and 
Latin America. Should these emissions be allocated to the modern independent state, or 
to the colonising state? 
Finally, with respect to the time period of analysis, there are three choices to be made. 
The first two choices are the start date and end date, which define the time interval for 
the emissions that will be attributed to regions (hereafter referred to as the attribution  
period, i.e. start date − end date). Emissions that occurred before or after the attribution 
period are included in the climate model but not attributed (see Figure 3.1). The third 
choice is the evaluation date, which is the time for which attribution is performed. Usu-
ally the indicator is assessed at the end of the attribution period. The evaluation date 
may, however, be any later date (see Figure 3.1). This would allow consideration of the 
long-term effects of emissions, but would only be relevant for indicators that have time-
dependent effects i.e. in the cause-effect chain from concentrations onwards, due to the 
inertia of the climate system. It is important to note that the contribution calculations can 
be applied to any period of time; Table 3.1 provides a set of considerations. 
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Figure 3.1 Schematisation of the impact of time period choices on attributed tempera-
ture changes. Source: Den Elzen et al. (2005a). 
3.3 Equality 
When using Equality as the guiding principle, the considerations above may be foregone 
and practical choices may be made based on an evaluation of e.g. the size of the country. 
These considerations are presented in Table 3.2. The most practical application of equal 
treatment of all individuals proposed in the mitigation framework is equal emissions per 
capita (Baer et al., 2000). The latter would shift most rights to emit from developed 
countries to developing countries and induce a large transfer of wealth from rich to poor 
countries at the same time. Panayotou et al. (2002), however, argue that equal per capita 
emissions provide an imperfect solution to the equity dilemma, because not all individu-
als experience the same damages from climate change. The latter in combination with 
the large wealth transfers would not generate support for this proposal by the developed 
countries in climate policy negotiations. 
Limited views exist regarding burden sharing of adaptation costs based on equality con-
siderations. Obvious choices are attributing adaptation costs to individual countries on 
the basis of their share in the world population, or by setting an amount of adaptation 
costs per square kilometre. Both measures involve a size effect for individual countries, 
but if the costs would be shared equally one can or should also incorporate the residual 
damages. As such all burdens would be shared equally, however, ex ante determination 
of residual damages seems deeply problematic. 
Table 3.2 Policy choices for Equality. 
Issues Options Considerations/remarks 
Indicator: 
 
• Population number 
• Land area 
The unit of choice may be an individual or a country 
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3.4 Capacity 
Capacity to Pay approaches that take the economic capacity of a country as a starting 
point: countries should not bear unacceptably high costs. Müller et al. (2007) provide an 
excellent overview of different indicators that can be used to assess the Capacity per-
spective. In this assessment we limit ourselves to two straightforward interpretations of 
Capacity by looking at absolute GDP levels and the UN Scale of Assessment. 
The system of financial contributions of individual member states to the UN is com-
monly agreed, through the General Assembly, to be based on the principle of Capacity to 
Pay. The level of these contributions is determined by the Committee on Contributions 
for a three year period and recorded in the UN Scale of Assessment (UN, 2007). This 
consensus among member states on the principle used to apportion the cost burden 
makes the UN Scale of Assessment a fair indicator of Capacity to Pay. In broad terms, 
countries’ share in the cost burden is determined by their recent level of GNI, with some 
correctional factors. The exact procedure and the level of assessment can be retrieved 
from the resolution. Noteworthy is that special arrangements have been made for LDCs 
by setting a maximum assessment rate of 0,01%. For the developed countries this maxi-
mum rate is set at 22% is set. On the other hand, as all member states need to share in  
financing the UN a minimum rate of 0,001% has been set. 
Burden sharing schemes based on Capacity to Pay can be implemented in two forms, e.g. 
flat rates and progressive rates. Flat rates distribute the total costs climate change such 
that all countries pay an equal share of their wealth. A problem with applying flat rates is 
that the outcomes are not fully dealt with (Shue, 1999). With flat rates, people or coun-
tries can fall below a minimum income level required for survival. Baer et al. (2007)  
defines Capacity to Pay in a different way and analyzes how much countries are capable 
of paying above a certain threshold level. The latter implies that high-income countries 
should contribute about 80% to the costs of climate change. Progressive rates display a 
growing share of wealth with increasing incomes. So those who are wealthier also pay 
relatively more. This is another way to overcome the above-explained difficulty. Criti-
cism on progressive rates holds that it takes away incentives for becoming wealthy in the 
first place. 
Table 3.3  Policy choices for Capacity. 
Issues Options Considerations/remarks 
Indicator: 
 
• Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
• UN Scale of Assessment 
country total vs. per capita 
flat rate vs. progressive rate 
 
3.5 CBDR assessment: A set of concrete choices 
The described policy options in combination with the technical/scientific options out-
lined in Appendix I produce an extremely complex set of choices for policymakers. 
There are many different combinations of options, each leading to specific outcomes. In 
the following chapter we work towards a restricted set of concrete (feasible) choices in 
the form of so-called images, or scenarios. However, to illustrate the impact of specific 
choices on the historical responsibility of countries, we first determine a “default case” 
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in the numerical assessment in Chapter 4 along which individual variants of policy 
choices related to historical responsibility are explored. As Equality and Capacity are 
outcome-based, separate cases are presented for these perspectives. Justification of the 
specific values used in these variants is deferred to Chapter 4. 
Apart from the cases that resemble each of the different policy perspectives described in 
Sections 3.2 through 3.4, it can be argued that a full evaluation of an equitable (or fair) 
distribution of responsibility for adaptation financing internationally should be based on 
an integration of the underlying perspectives. Only an integrated approach can really 
lead to a full CBDR assessment (cf. Table 2.1). Integration of the different perspectives 
can be implemented in several ways; we explore a wide range of alternative scenarios. 
The specification of these scenarios tries to attain a balance between all fairness consid-
erations, such that the scenarios may serve as a credible basis in negotiations. 
Summarising, the following set of scenarios will be explored in the numerical assess-
ment in Chapter 4: 
Image Label Variants 
I Responsibility a) Default case (cf. Chapter 4) 
b) Single variation of policy options 
II Equality a) Contribution on basis of population 
III Capacity a) Contribution on basis of GDP 
b) Contribution on basis of UN Scale of Assessment 2007-2009 
IV CBDR 1. Full historical contribution to warming – 1750 
2. Historical contribution to warming – 1900 
3. Historical contribution to emissions – 1900 
4. Protocol contribution to warming – 1990 
5. Protocol contribution to emissions – 1990 
6. Limited responsibility protocol contribution to emissions – 
1990 
7. Present emissions – 2005 
Each scenario is integrated with two Capacity indicators (leading to 
14 CBDR scenarios in total): 
1. GDP 
2. UN scale of assessment 2007-2009 
 
 

Sharing the burden of adaptation financing  25
4. Consequences for specific groups of countries  
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims at providing insights into the implications of different policy choices 
on the attribution of adaptation costs to specific groups of countries, based on the three 
principles outlined in Chapter 2. Besides analysing the dynamics of these choices a set of 
scenarios is discussed, using a CBDR, which may serve as a useful starting point or ref-
erence case in the negotiation process. The quantitative analysis in this report primarily 
builds upon the work of den Elzen et al. (2005a), which uses the general MATCH cli-
mate model (see Appendix I) to analyse the influence of different policy-related and  
scientific choices on the calculated regional contributions to global climate change (the 
“Brazilian Proposal” as discussed in Chapter 1) 3. We further extend the analysis to a 
country-level, using the general MATCH climate model combined with a historical 
emissions dataset at the level of 192 UN countries, as described in Höhne et al. (2008) 
and briefly explained in the Appendix I. 
4.2 Historical responsibility – the default case 
In identifying the extent to which regions and individual countries have a historical  
responsibility for the climate change problem, we concentrate on two indicators of cli-
mate change, (i) global warming potential (GWP) weighted cumulative emissions and 
(ii) their effect on global-mean surface air temperature. These two indicators are most 
commonly used and most intuitive. The Brazilian proposal suggested that the global-
mean surface air temperature increase should be used, but other indicators would be pos-
sible as well (UNFCCC, 2002). 
The default case (see choices underlined in Table 4.1) serves as a starting point in the 
analysis of impacts of underlying policy choices on historical responsibility. Following 
the Brazilian proposal, we calculate the contributions to the temperature increase in 2005 
from the emission from 1900 to 2005 for all GHGs and sectors. We assume full respon-
sibility, as this is the most common used and does not require the difficulty of estimating 
the emission level associated with harmless climate impacts. In fact, the latter issue has 
only been introduced recently by Müller et al. (2007). Furthermore, the historical emis-
sions are based on producer-based estimates, because the consumer-based estimates in 
the literature are not available for all regions and highly uncertain. A limited set of gases 
is included as historical emission levels on F-gases, i.e. HFCs, PFCs and SF6, are also 
surrounded by uncertainty. It seems natural to include all anthropogenic emissions as a 
starting point for historical responsibility. Data limitations in the period 1750-1900 jus-
tify the choice for 1900 as the start date in the default case, because for non-CO2 gases 
emission data is non-existent before 1900. Furthermore, LULUCF related CO2 emission 
levels are available only from 1850 onwards4. The attribution and evaluation date are set 
in 2005 for two reasons. First, the most recent emission data available date from that 
year. Second and in line with the first argument, future attribution and evaluation dates 
                                                   
3  The calculations are at the level of 13 world regions. 
4  Extrapolation was used (see Appendix I) in the other scenarios to cover the complete period. 
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are based on hypothetical emission levels. Hereby, they send out the wrong message, as 
climate policy is aimed at reducing these emission levels. The attribution period does not 
end in 1990, because we are interested in establishing historical responsibility covering 
past and more recent periods. 
Table 4.1  Specifications of policy choices, with the default case (underlined). 
Alternative policy choices evaluated numerically 
Basic needs Full responsibility, limited responsibility 
Causal attribution Producer-based 
GHG mix CO2, [CO2, CH4, N2O]*  
Indicator GWP-weighted cumulative GHG emissions, temperature increase 
Land-use change all anthropogenic GHG emissions, Energy and Industry CO2 only 
Attribution start date 1750, 1900, 1950 and 1990 Timeframes  
Attribution end date 1990, 2005, 2050 and 2100 
 Evaluation date 2005, 2050, 2100, 2500 
 * henceforth labelled as all gases 
 
Table 4.2  The contributions (%) to the increase in global-mean surface temperature in 
2005 according to the default policy choices. 
Country % Country % 
Annex I  53 Non-Annex I  47 
Australia 1.5 Rest-OECD  2.6 
Canada 2.2 Mexico* 1.3 
Japan 2.8 Turkey 0.7 
New Zealand 0.3 Brazil, China, India   19 
Russia 7.0 Brazil 4.7 
Ukraine 1.8 China* 10.8 
USA* 18.7 India 3.7 
EU-25  18 OPEC  8 
EU-15  14 Indonesia* 3.6 
France 2.1 Nigeria 0.8 
Germany* 3.8 Venezuela 0.9 
Italy 1.2 AOSIS  1 
Netherlands 0.6 Cuba* 0.2 
Spain 0.7 Maldives 0.00 
UK 3.2 LDC  5 
  Afghanistan 0.07 
  Congo* 0.6 
  Rest World  13 
  Argentina 0.9 
  South Africa* 0.9 
* Representing the country within the group with the highest contribution  
Source: MATCH climate model. 
 
According to these reference calculations, of which the results are presented in Table 
4.2, just over half of the historical contributions is attributed to the Annex I countries. At 
the country level, the two major current emitters of CO2, USA and China, also have the 
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largest historical contribution. When the European Union (EU25) is regarded as an en-
tity, it accounts for 18 percent of global contributions; with Germany and the UK as the 
major countries within the EU-total; The Netherlands has a contribution of 0.6 percent. 
Large developing countries have contributions that are of the same order of magnitude, 
or are even larger, than those of OECD countries (apart from the USA); the main source 
of these contributions is however, different: they stem to a much larger extent from 
emissions due to land-use change and deforestation, whereas for the OECD countries 
emissions from energy-use play a bigger role. 
4.3 Historical responsibility – sensitivity of the default case 
The end of the previous section already noted that the choices made to form the default 
case may affect the attribution of responsibilities. This section investigates the degree to 
which each of these particular choices individually affects the historical responsibility by 
varying a single choice at a time, using the default case as a reference. 
Varying the indicator 
Switching between increases in temperature to cumulative emissions as an indicator of 
climate change only affects responsibilities to a minimum extent in most cases. The ef-
fect is largest for countries that have a time path of emissions different to the world aver-
age, like Russia (in relative terms, compare column 1 with column 2). E.g. emissions in 
Russia were high in the 1980’s and are much lower today. Since the high emissions of 
the 1980’s have a full effect on temperature increase and the recent emissions yet have to 
develop their full effect, the relative contribution of Russia to temperature increase is 
larger than to cumulative emissions. 
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Figure 4.1 Relative contribution to cumulative emissions (first bar), to temperature  
increase in 2005 (second bar) based on emissions from 1900 to 2005 of all 
gases including LULUCF for selected countries and country-groups. 
Source: MATCH climate model. 
Full versus limited responsibility 
As a second variation we show the influence of limited versus full responsibility. In the 
full responsibility case responsibilities were determined by the level of aggregate historic 
emissions – representing causal contributions. Limited responsibility reduces these ag-
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gregate emission levels for each country by an annual basic level of harmless emissions 
per capita5. We adopt for the total level of harmless emissions (globally) a value of 7 Gt 
CO2eq, the current sink of CO2 by the oceans (Müller et al., 2007), which is allocated on 
a per capita basis. For ease of comparison we directly compare responsibilities in the full 
and limited scenarios based on cumulative emission levels, as the impact of the indicator 
was only marginal. Results are presented in Figure 4.2 and it is not surprising that the 
contribution of the LDCs is substantially reduced. It also decreases the contribution of 
non-Annex I, in particular for India and China due to their large population, and  
increases the contribution of most Annex I countries. The results are qualitatively in line 
with those presented by Müller et al. (2007). 
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Figure 4.2  Relative contribution to cumulative emissions for full vs. limited responsibil-
ity in 2005 based on emissions from 1900 to 2005 of all gases including 
LULUCF for selected countries and country-groups. Source: MATCH  
climate model. 
Varying the start date 
As a next case we show the influence of choosing a different year as of which to start  
accounting for emissions. Figure 4.3 shows the relative contribution to temperature  
increase in 2005 due to emissions from 1750, 1900, 1950 and 1990 to 2005 of all gases 
including LULUCF. The results of the climate model show the start date to have a strong 
impact on the regional contributions. Choosing a later attribution start date (e.g. 1950 or 
1990 instead of 1900) minimises the relative contributions of the industrialised countries 
(‘early emitters’) to temperature increase in 2005, emphasizing the shift in heavily emit-
ting countries over time. An exception is Russia, for which the relative contribution  
increases for start date 1950, since their rate of emission growth is low compared to the 
OECD90 over the 1900-1950 period. The rapid increase in emissions recently in China 
and India is also well reflected in the figure, highlighting again that fluctuation in emis-
sion profiles in combination with specific start dates affects the attribution of responsi-
bilities. 
                                                   
5  Calculated as the sum over all countries of the product population number in a country  
multiplied by countries’ per capita emissions corrected for per capita harmless emissions 
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Figure 4.3  Relative contribution to temperature increase in 2005 based on emissions 
using various start dates of all gases including LULUCF for selected coun-
tries and country-groups. Source: MATCH climate model. 
Varying the end date 
Figure 4.4 illustrates the regional contribution to global temperature increase for differ-
ent attribution end dates in 2005, 2020, 2050 and 2100. The emission start date is set 
back to the default case of 1900. By extending the attribution (and evaluation) period 
predicted future levels of emissions and their affect on climate change are also taken into 
account, having a strong impact on the relative contribution of most regions to increases 
in temperature. 
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Figure 4.4 Relative contribution to temperature change at four different end years from 
emissions from 1900 of all gases of all gases including LULUCF for se-
lected countries and country-groups. The future emission scenario used is 
A1B. Source: MATCH climate model. 
Choosing a point further into the future lowers the relative contributions of Annex I  
regions like USA and Russian Federation and raises those of non-Annex I regions, espe-
cially those with expected fast-growing emission levels after 2005, like India and China. 
The responsibility of developing regions for the rise in temperature will increase when 
high economic growth is combined with a diminishing economical gap between Annex I 
and non-Annex I regions. Note that future attribution end dates attribute the effect of 
emissions from a future emissions trajectory, not just historical emissions. Using a dif-
ferent IPCC-SRES emission scenario, as analysed in den Elzen et al. (2005a), has a 
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strong influence on a region’s relative contribution to temperature change in 2100 (not 
shown here). 
Varying the evaluation date 
The third time-frame choice is the evaluation date, the year in which the attribution cal-
culations are performed; see Figure 3.1. Using an evaluation date after the attribution end 
date, captures the delayed effects in the climate system and accounts for delayed, but in-
evitable, global warming, and also discounts early effects. It therefore shifts the weight 
towards the effect of long-lived gases and towards most recent emissions. Figure 4.5  
depicts the impact of two evaluation dates, using the default values for the attribution 
start date (1900) and end date (2005). For a fixed attribution end date (2005) and an 
evaluation date far beyond 2005 (here 2100), the relative contribution for Annex I rises, 
while contributions for the other regions drop. The major reason is related to the rela-
tively small share for the Annex I regions in CH4 emissions compared to other regions. 
Since CH4 has a relatively short lifetime in the atmosphere, the large amount of forcing 
resulting from CH4 emissions for non-Annex I regions will dissipate quickly. Thus non-
Annex I contributions are lowered compared to the Annex I contributions as the evalua-
tion time is shifted further into the future. Another reason explaining this is the larger 
Annex I share in historical CO2 emissions. Historical emissions form a large part of the 
contribution to CO2 concentration, due to the slow responses of some components of the 
carbon cycle. Thus, the fraction of total contribution caused by historical emissions  
remaining in the atmosphere will fade away more slowly than the contribution from e.g. 
methane. 
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Figure 4.5 Relative contribution to temperature change in 2005 and 2100 based on 
emissions from 1900 to 2005 of all gases including LULUCF for selected 
countries and country-groups. Source: MATCH climate model. 
Varying the gas mix and land-use change 
As a final case we study the influence of including or excluding emissions from land-use 
change and forestry as well as the non-CO2 gases CH4 and N2O. These emissions are 
significant for some countries, but are also surrounded by more uncertain compared to 
CO2 from energy and industry with respect to reliability of historical emission data. 
Figure 4.6 shows the relative contribution to temperature increase in 2005 from emis-
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sions from 1900 to 2005 of all gases including and excluding LULUCF, for CO2 only 
(including LULUCF) and for CO2 from energy and industry only. 
The difference with the default case is largest for countries with high emissions from  
deforestation and/or from CH4 and N2O in particular to Brazil, China and India. Annex I 
countries usually have lower relative contributions when all gases and sectors are con-
sidered, which is most apparent for Japan. The most sensitive countries are those with a 
low state of industrial development, but large emissions from agriculture and deforesta-
tion. 
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Figure 4.6  Relative contribution to temperature increase in 2005 based on emissions 
from 1900 to 2005 of all gases including and excluding LULUCF and non 
CO2 gases for selected countries and country-groups. Source: MATCH  
climate model. 
4.4 Equality and capacity 
The previous analysis focused on responsibilities in the international financing of adapta-
tion from a PPP perspective, by calculating the contribution of specific regions and 
countries to the climate change problem. In the previous chapters two additional princi-
ples were analysed that paid more attention to the distribution of adaptation costs. Both 
the Equality and Capacity perspective provided indicators that can be used to divide 
these costs among countries. For these indicators separate scenarios are presented below. 
We have included a single indicator for Equality, i.e. equal contribution per country 
based on population size. The calculation for the contribution of countries is then calcu-
lated as the share in world population, as shown in Figure 4.7. Financing adaptation on 
the basis of share in population evidently leads to a large burden for the developing 
countries, and may lead to the situation that the developing countries are financing the 
adaptation costs of the Annex I countries. This option is therefore not very realistic from 
a policy perspective, especially since this option would imply imposing an equal lump 
sum tax on everybody. 
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Figure 4.7  Relative contribution to indicators of Equality (population) and Capacity 
(GDP and UN scale of assessment). Source: WRI-CAIT tool (population, 
GDP, http://cait.wri.org/) and UN (2007). 
Capacity to Pay is, however, likely to offer more feasible indicators for the division of 
costs. Section 3.4 described two attractive and common used indicators of Capacity to 
Pay, i.e. GDP and the UN Scale of Assessment. The contribution based on income leads 
evidently to the highest contribution for the Annex I countries. The burden is even fur-
ther shifted towards Annex I countries due to the maximum limit of contributions set for 
LDCs in the UN Scale of Assessment 2007-2009 (UN, 2007)6. Interesting in this per-
spective are the low responsibilities of China and India in the UN scenario. Table 4.3 
presents more detailed numbers on the results for these different indicators. 
 
                                                   
6  We also calculated a scenario based on GDP excluding LDCs, which increases the shares of 
all other countries by a factor of 1.017, thereby hardly affecting responsibilities; these results 
are not presented in Figure 4.7. 
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Table 4.3 The contributions (%) of the equality and capacity indicators. 
 Country %-
popul
ation 
%-
GDP 
%-UN 
scale of 
assess-
ment 
 Country %-
popu-
lation 
%-
GDP 
%-UN 
scale of 
assess-
ment 
An-
nex I 
 20 57 86 Non-
Annex 
I 
 80 43 14 
 Australia 0.3 1.1 1.8 Rest-
OECD 
 3.5 4.6 4.8 
 Canada 0.5 1.8 3.0  Mexico* 1.6 1.8 2.3 
 Japan 2.0 6.7 16.6  Turkey 1.1 1.0 0.4 
 New Zea-
land 
0.1 0.2 0.3 Brazil, 
China, 
India  
 41 22 3.9 
 Russia 2.2 2.5 1.2  Brazil 2.9 2.6 0.9 
 Ukraine 0.7 0.5 0.0  China* 20.3 13.7 2.7 
 USA* 4.6 20.7 22  India 17.4 5.9 0.5 
EU-
25 
 
8 22 39 
OPEC  
9.0 4.4 2.1 
EU-
15 
 
6 20 37 
 Indone-
sia* 3.5 1.4 0.2 
 France 0.9 3.1 6.3  Nigeria 2.1 0.2 0.0 
 Germany* 
1.3 4.1 8.6 
 Vene-
zuela 0.4 0.3 0.2 
 Italy 0.9 2.9 5.1 AOSIS  0.8 0.6 0.6 
 Nether-
lands 0.3 0.9 1.9 
 
Cuba* 0.1 
0.00
5 0.1 
 Spain 0.7 2.0 3.0  Maldives 0.02 0.03 0.0 
 UK 0.9 3.4 6.6 LDC  11.5 1.7 0.1 
  
  
  Afghani-
stan 0.37 0.04 0.0 
      Congo* 0.88 0.07 0.0 
  
  
 Rest 
World 
 17.9 11.6 5.0 
      Argentina 0.6 0.9 0.3 
     South  
Africa* 
0.7 0.9 0.3 
* Representing the country within the group with the highest contribution  
Source: WRI-CAIT tool (population, GDP, http://cait.wri.org/) and UN (2007). 
4.5 CBDR 
4.5.1 CBDR scenarios 
Obviously not any of these individual cases would survive on itself in the negotiations 
process on coping with the burdens of climate change. A more realistic approach is to 
combine elements of Responsibility and Capacity in order to have a more feasible set of 
scenarios. Essential for this approach is to determine a target level of required adaptation 
(and mitigation) funds that can be divided along CBDR. The way in which these funds 
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should be divided is highly dependent on the balance between Responsibility and  
Capacity and the set of policy choices as discussed in Table 3.1. For this purpose, we ex-
plore a whole range of scenarios that may provide an image of potential cost distribu-
tions under a new climate policy. 
Within these scenarios we strive to include as many GHGs as possible, LULUCF and the 
most recent set emissions, because all contribute to the problem of climate change and 
hence should be considered in a fair distribution of its burden based on Responsibility. 
This implies that we maintain part of the settings from our default case, i.e. including all 
gases, LULUCF and set the attribution and evaluation date up to 2005. Note that we do 
not include projected future emission levels as they conflict with the goal of climate pol-
icy to reduce them, and we prefer to use data of historical observed data, and not based 
on uncertain future emission projections. Furthermore, we assume an equal balance be-
tween Responsibility and Capacity by giving both an equal weight in the calculations. 
Variations are brought in by (i) the extent to which countries can be held responsible for 
their past emissions, (ii) the indicator of climate change and (iii) full or limited responsi-
bility, i.e. without or with correction for “harmless” emissions. With respect to Capacity 
to Pay, both the GDP and the UN Scale of Assessment 2007-2009 are used to illustrate 
these various responsibility scenarios. Below we discuss in total 7 CBDR scenarios and 
illustrate them for each indicator for Capacity in Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9. 
CBDR scenario #1: Full historical contribution to warming 
(including all GHG emissions from 1750 to 2005 including LULUCF; indicator: tem-
perature change) 
From a PPP perspective countries are responsible for the effects all their past emissions 
had and still have on the climate system. This is illustrated for the Responsibility part of 
the CBDR scenario by including all gases and by setting the start date at 1750, the date 
from which emission data is available, such that all known emission levels are attributed 
to individual countries and form the basis for a full responsibility to global warming. 
CBDR scenario #2: Historical contribution to warming (default case) 
(including all GHG emissions from 1900 to 2005 including LULUCF; indicator: tem-
perature change) 
The Responsibility part of this CBDR scenario is equivalent to our default case presented 
in section 4.2. Compared to CBDR scenario 1 this scenario has the same goal of com-
pensating for climate change damages caused by individual countries. The reliability of 
the underlying emission data has, however, improved by setting the start date to 1900. 
As noted in Section 4.3 the impacts of changing the start date from 1750 to 1900 can be 
expected to be marginal. 
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CBDR scenario #3: Historical contribution to emissions 
(including all GHG emissions from 1900 to 2005 including LULUCF; indicator: cumu-
lative emissions) 
As not all impacts of past emissions have revealed themselves through increases in tem-
perature it can be argued that it is fairer to distribute the adaptation cost based on cumu-
lative emission levels, as this indicator does not have a time lag. 
CBDR scenario #4: Protocol contribution to warming 
(including all GHG emissions from 1990 to 2005 including LULUCF; indicator: tem-
perature change) 
Knowing about climate change might not be sufficient to establish state responsibility. A 
more convincing argument is that countries could (and maybe should) have acted from 
the moment they started to negotiate on how to address the problem. In the case of cli-
mate change negotiations started around 1990. Therefore, countries are assumed to be 
responsible from 1990 onwards for the effect their emissions caused on global average 
temperature up to now. 
CBDR scenario #5: Protocol contribution to emissions 
(including all GHG emissions from 1990 to 2005 including LULUCF; indicator: cumu-
lative emissions) 
In the same vein CBDR scenario 5 uses 1990 as a starting date, but determines historical 
responsibility on the basis of cumulative emission levels over the 1990-2005 period. 
CBDR scenario #6: Limited responsibility protocol contribution to emissions 
(including all GHG emissions from 1990 to 2005 including LULUCF; indicator: cumu-
lative emissions; correcting for basic harmless per capita emissions) 
As a variation to CDBR scenario 5 this scenario also takes into account that not all emis-
sion levels cause damages. Hence, countries can not be held responsible for their “harm-
less” emissions during the attribution period. 
CBDR scenario #7: Present contributions to emission levels 
(including all GHG emissions for 2005 including LULUCF; indicator: cumulative emis-
sions) 
Alternatively, it can be argued that a PPP based policy can only make countries respon-
sible from the moment that the policy gets into force. Hence, the adaptation regime 
should only look at recent contributions to climate change. By adopting this approach of 
sharing the total burden over new emissions level the attention is shifted more towards 
prevention of new emissions. If the regime only looks at the previous year, new emitters 
need to cover all the adaptation costs. As these new emissions had limited time to affect 
the climate system, emission levels are taken as an indicator of climate change. 
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4.5.2 CBDR implications 
Many of the individual variations between scenarios have already been discussed in Sec-
tion 4.3 and are therefore not discussed here. It is more interesting to look at the overall 
difference between the CBDR scenarios, especially because they also take into account 
the capacity aspect. As noted in section 4.4 using the UN Scale of Assessment as an  
indicator of capacity heavily increases the burden on Annex I countries from around 
57% to 86% compared to using GDP levels. However, it becomes apparent from Figure 
4.8 that the choice for a particular CBDR scenario in general affects the responsibility of 
countries in the margin. Of course, several scenarios are extremely beneficial or costly 
for particular regions and countries. The USA, Europe and Russia, for example, profit 
from CDBR scenario 7, as the concentration in emission levels moved to other countries 
during the past decade. Most important to note is that a large transfer of wealth will be 
directed towards the AOSIS countries and LDCs in each of the CBDR scenarios, which 
also experience the largest impacts of climate change. This is even achieved more by  
using the UN Scale of Assessment, which on the other hand also is very beneficial for 
China. Overall we may conclude that negotiation possibilities exist, which can have  
major implications for particular countries, especially through the choice of capacity in-
dicator. However, in general impacts vary to a smaller extent for the separate responsi-
bility scenarios. Further details on these implications are provided in Tables 4.4 and 4.5. 
Assuming costs of climate adaptation is $100 billion per year (UNDP, 2007), the total 
financial contribution by The Netherlands could range between $600-1300 million per 
year, depending on the principles and parameters chosen. For instance, if contributions to 
global surface mean temperature increases in 2005 are taken as a measure, the contribu-
tion of The Netherlands would be 0.6% of total global adaptation costs. However, if we 
include Capacity to Pay as a criterion and use the UN Scale of Assessment measure, the 
contribution of The Netherlands would rise to up to 1.3%. 
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Figure 4.8  The contribution to capacity (GDP)-responsibility index. 
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Figure 4.9  The contribution to capacity (UN scale)-responsibility index. 
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Table 4.4  The contributions (%) based on CBDR scenarios, using GDP for capacity. 
 Country Scenario 
1 
Scenario 
2 
Scenario 
3 
Scenario 
4 
Scenario 
5 
Scenario 
6 
Scenario 
7 
Annex I  56 53 56 56 51 52 55 
Australia 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 
Canada 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.1 
Japan 4.7 5.4 4.8 4.8 4.8 5.1 5.2 
New Zealand 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Russia 4.7 4.0 4.8 4.6 4.4 4.1 4.5 
Ukraine 1.1 0.8 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.0 
USA* 20.2 19.5 19.9 20.3 18.5 19.0 20.5 
EU-25  20 18 20 20 18 18 19 
EU-15  17 16 17 17 15 15 16 
France 2.7 2.2 2.6 2.7 2.3 2.3 2.4 
Germany* 3.9 3.5 4.0 4.1 3.4 3.5 3.7 
Italy 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 
Netherlands 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 
Spain 1.3 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 
UK 3.5 2.6 3.3 3.5 2.6 2.6 2.7 
Non-Annex I  45 48 45 44 49 49 46 
Rest-OECD  3.6 4.3 3.6 3.6 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Mexico* 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 
Turkey 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 
Brazil, 
China, India  
 21 23 21 21 23 22 20 
Brazil 3.6 3.1 3.7 3.5 3.8 3.6 3.8 
China* 12.8 15.1 12.4 12.4 13.7 13.7 12.8 
India 5.0 4.8 4.9 4.9 5.5 4.9 3.3 
OPEC  6.1 7.2 6.2 6.0 7.1 7.0 7.2 
Indonesia* 2.6 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.8 2.9 3.0 
Nigeria 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.4 
Venezuela 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
AOSIS  0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.1 
Cuba* 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Maldives 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
LDC  3.3 2.6 3.2 3.2 3.5 3.0 2.5 
Afghanistan 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Congo* 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 
Rest World  12.3 11.8 12.5 12.2 13.4 12.7 12.2 
Argentina 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 
South  
Africa* 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 
Sharing the burden of adaptation financing  39
Table 4.5  The contributions (%) based on CBDR scenarios, using UN scale of assess-
ment for capacity. 
 Country Scenario 
1 
Scenario 
2 
Scenario 
3 
Scenario 
4 
Scenario 
5 
Scenario 
6 
Scenario 
7 
Annex I  70 67 70 70 65 66 69 
Australia 1.6 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.9 
Canada 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.7 
Japan 9.6 10.3 9.7 9.8 9.7 10.0 10.2 
New Zealand 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Russia 4.1 3.3 4.1 3.9 3.7 3.5 3.9 
Ukraine 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 
USA* 20.7 20.0 20.4 20.8 19.0 19.5 21.0 
EU-25  28 26 28 29 26 26 27 
EU-15  26 24 26 26 24 24 25 
France 4.2 3.8 4.2 4.3 3.8 3.9 3.9 
Germany* 6.1 5.7 6.2 6.3 5.6 5.7 5.9 
Italy 3.1 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.3 
Netherlands 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Spain 1.8 2.1 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0 
UK 5.1 4.2 4.9 5.1 4.2 4.2 4.3 
Non-Annex I  30 33 30 30 35 34 31 
Rest-OECD  3.7 4.4 3.7 3.7 4.0 4.1 4.1 
Mexico* 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.9 1.9 1.9 
Turkey 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 
Brazil, 
China, India  
 12 14 12 11 14 13 10 
Brazil 2.7 2.2 2.8 2.6 2.9 2.7 2.9 
China* 7.1 9.5 6.7 6.7 8.1 8.0 7.1 
India 2.2 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.7 2.1 0.5 
OPEC  4.9 6.0 5.0 4.9 5.9 5.9 6.0 
Indonesia* 2.0 2.1 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.4 
Nigeria 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.4 
Venezuela 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 
AOSIS  0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 
Cuba* 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Maldives 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
LDC  2.4 1.8 2.4 2.3 2.6 2.2 1.7 
Afghanistan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Congo* 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 
Rest World  9.0 8.4 9.1 8.9 10.0 9.3 8.9 
Argentina 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.6 
South Af-
rica* 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 
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5.  Conclusions 
As global impacts of climate change become more evident and serious, and given that a 
large part of the impacts will be felt in less developed countries and regions, the issue of 
international financing of adaptation to climate change impacts has become more urgent. 
This report aims to establish a conceptual framework for assessing responsibilities for in-
ternational financing of adaptation related to climate change, in line with ethical princi-
ples established in philosophy, jurisprudence and economics. Using equity as the starting 
point, several guiding principles are at hand to distribute the costs of global adaptation 
efforts among countries: no harm; polluter pays; precaution; solidarity; and consequen-
tialism. These principles have been translated into policy principles that we term  
responsibility, equality and capacity. Although it is possible to adopt each one of these 
principles separately, with divergent results, we believe that a politically legitimate and 
therefore feasible approach would be to find a balance between them in what we term 
common but differentiated responsibility. We have conducted a quantitative analysis of a 
variety of policy scenarios to show what consequences they would have for the alloca-
tion of responsibility for the international financing of adaptation. 
There are many policy choices to be made when establishing the contributions of differ-
ent countries to climate change. Many alternatives exist; all have their merits. One rule 
of thumb that arises from these alternatives is that there is a trade-off between being 
complete, in the sense of including as many aspects that contribute to climate change  
impacts as possible, and being reliable, in the sense of being able to provide estimates 
with reasonable confidence intervals. For example, including greenhouse gases besides 
CO2 may be important from a theoretical perspective, but difficulties in estimating past 
emission levels of these gases, in combination with the limited contribution of these 
gases to the division of contributions across countries, may argue for a less complete but 
more reliable approach. From a legal perspective reliability may also be a desirable char-
acteristic of the choices to be made. Precedent suggests that technical uncertainty will 
undermine claims of responsibility as a basis for establishing a global climate adaptation 
compensation fund. 
The quantitative analysis shows that both the principles themselves, and the values of 
key parameters that are chosen in expressing them, have a marked influence on results. 
For instance, if contributions to global surface mean temperature increases in 2005 are 
taken as a measure, the contribution of The Netherlands would be 0.6% of total global 
adaptation costs. However, if we include Capacity to Pay as a criterion and use the UN 
Scale of Assessment measure, the contribution of The Netherlands would rise to up to 
1.3%. Assuming costs of climate adaptation is $100 billion per year (UNDP, 2007), the 
total financial contribution by The Netherlands could range between $600-1300 million 
per year, depending on the principles and parameters chosen. 
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Appendix I. Modelling assumptions and data choices  
MATCH climate model 
For this analysis we use the simple default model as used in the earlier MATCH exercise 
(also MATCH climate model), as described in detail in (den Elzen et al., 2005a). This 
model is based on Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) for the calculations of concentra-
tions, temperature change and sea level rise, and based on functional dependencies from 
the IPCC-TAR (Ramaswamy et al., 2001) for the radiative forcing (e.g., logarithmic 
function for CO2). For the CO2 concentration, the IRF is based on the parameterisations 
of the Bern carbon cycle model of Joos et al. (1996; 1999), as applied in the IPCC Third 
Assessment Report. For the concentrations of the non-CO2 GHGs, single-fixed lifetimes 
are used. The total radiative forcing considered here consists of the radiative forcing 
from CO2, CH4 and N2O plus direct and indirect radiative forcing from aerosols derived 
by the coupled ocean-atmosphere General Circulation Model HADCM3 (Stott, 2000). 
Surface temperature change is modelled using two-term IRFs also derived from the 
HADCM3 model. The contributions of individual emissions to concentrations, tempera-
ture change and sea level rise are calculated by separately applying all equations defined 
at global level to the emissions of the individual emitting regions. The assumption of 
linearity of these steps in the MATCH climate model ensures that the sum of the regional 
contributions is equal to the contribution of the global total. The relationship between 
concentration and radiative forcing is non-linear (‘saturation effect’). Here, the normal-
ised “marginal method” is used as default (taking the effect of small additional emissions 
normalized so that the sum of all contributions is the total effect, see also (den Elzen et 
al., 2005a). Here, we use the ECOFYS implementation of the MATCH climate model 
(see: Höhne et al., 2005; Höhne et al., 2008). This model calculates the contribution to 
climate impact indicators, including global temperature increase at the levels of coun-
tries, using an historical emissions data set based on the UNFCCC, IEA, EPA and PBL, 
as described below. 
Emissions data 
A new emission datasets has been compiled with results for 192 countries or regions for 
three sectors: energy and industry (CO2, CH4, N2O), agriculture/waste (non-CO2) and 
land use change and forestry (CO2) from1750 to 2100. Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs and 
HCFCs), Perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and Sulphurhexafluoride (SF6) were not included as 
historical emission estimates were not available on a gas-by-gas level. Total cumulative 
GWP-weighted historical emissions of these omitted gases (as collected in: Höhne et al., 
2005) amount to about 0.5% of total cumulative historical emissions of CO2, CH4 and 
N2O collected here. 
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The emissions database was compiled by first collecting historical and future emission 
estimates by country or region, by gas and by sector from the following sources and  
ordered them in the following hierarchy (see also Höhne et al., 2008) based on expert 
judgement. The datasets vary in their completeness and sectoral split: 
1. National submissions to the UNFCCC as collected by the UNFCCC secretariat and 
published in the GHG emission database available at their web site. For Annex I 
countries the latest available year is usually from 1990 to 2004. Most non-Annex I 
countries report only or until 1994 (UNFCCC, 2005). 
2. CO2 emissions from fuel combustion as published by the International Energy 
Agency. It covers usually the year 1970 to 2004 (IEA, 2006)7 This dataset was sup-
plemented by process emissions from cement production from (Marland et al., 2003) 
to be cover all industrial CO2 emissions. 
3. Emissions from CH4 and N2O as estimated by the US Environmental Protection 
Agency. It covers the years 1990 to 2005 (USEPA, 2006). 
4. CO2 emissions from fuel combustion and cement production as published by Mar-
land (2003) as retrieved in 2006. It includes emissions from 246 countries (existing 
and no longer present today) from earliest 1750 (only OECD countries) or 1950 to 
2003. 
5. Regional past data: Edgar/Hyde available for all sectors, 17 regions from 1890 to 
1990 (Klein Goldewijk and Battjes, 1995). 
6. Regional future regional emission data: PBL/RIVM IMAGE 2.2 implementation of 
the SRES scenarios (IMAGE team, 2001), available for all gases and sectors from 
1970 to 2100 for 17 regions. 
The new database was then completed by applying an algorithm to the hierarchy. For 
each country, gas and the sectors “energy & industry” and “waste & agriculture”, the  
algorithm comprises the following steps: 
1. For all data sets, missing years in-between available years within a data set are lin-
early interpolated and the growth rate is calculated for each year step. 
2. The data source is selected, which is highest in hierarchy and for which emission 
data are available. All available data points are chosen as the basis for absolute emis-
sions. 
3. Still missing years are filled by applying the growth rates from the highest data set in 
the hierarchy for which a growth rate is available. 
Some past and future emissions are only available on a regional basis and not country-
by-country. In these cases we applied regional growth rates to country level emission  
estimates. This essentially back casts the current territory of a county into the past; terri-
torial changes are not taken into account. Other methods for downscaling regional 
growth to individual countries within a region are available (van Vuuren et al., 2007). 
For LULUCF, we used a different approach (de Campos, 2007). The use of growth rates 
is not possible here as the estimates can be negative (removals). Hence we used the sim-
ple approach of taking the average between the two datasets that for the global total  
represent the two extremes: Houghton (2003) and IVIG (de Campos et al., 2005). Both 
                                                   
7  The IEA calculation is less detailed than national calculations and may be treating distribu-
tion losses and feedstock differently. 
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datasets were extended to 2100 using SRES scenarios. To downscale from SRES regions 
to nations, a concept of “potential LULUCF sink” is used, simply assuming that the 
more a country has emitted from LULUCF in the past, the more potential it has to create 
a sink by reverting to the original biomes. As potential LULUCF depends on past emis-
sions, this also prolongs the difference between Houghton and IVIG. A more sophisti-
cated model should take into account climate feedbacks and changing demand for agri-
culture etc., this is just a first approximation for reasonable downscaling. 
Evidently the emissions data are surrounded with uncertainties, which are larger for the 
emissions in the past than present, and also larger for the non-CO2 greenhouse gases than 
CO2. Therefore this dataset also includes a low and high estimate, as described in Höhne 
et al. (2008). For the analysis in this study, we will however not present the impact of 
uncertainties on the countries’ contributions, and refer to Höhne et al. (2008). 
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Table I.1  The contributions (%) to the climate indicator (global-mean surface tem-
perature change (default) or cumulative GHG emissions or other indicator) 
in end-date (default: 2005). 
  Indicator Start date End date 
Cases  Cumul-
ative 
Emissions 
Tempera-
ture 
(REF) 1750 
1900 
(REF) 1950 1990 
2005 
(REF) 2020 2050 2100 
 Country % % % % % % % % % % 
Annex I  55 53 53 53 52 45 53 49 39 32 
Non-
Annex I  45 47 47 47 48 55 47 51 61 68 
Annex I  55 53 53 53 52 45 53 49 39 32 
 Australia 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.2 
 Canada 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.1 1.7 1.5 
 Japan 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.8 3.0 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.3 1.8 
 
New Zea-
land 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 
 Russia 6.6 7.0 6.9 7.0 7.4 6.2 7.0 6.3 5.3 4.6 
 Ukraine 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.8 2.0 1.5 1.8 1.5 1.2 1.0 
 USA 19.6 18.7 19.5 18.7 17.5 15.9 18.7 17.4 13.2 11.0 
 EU-25 19 18 18 18 17 13 18 16 12 10 
 EU-15 15 14 14 14 13 10 14 12 9 7 
 France 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.4 2.1 1.8 1.3 1.0 
 Germany 4.0 3.8 3.6 3.8 3.6 2.6 3.8 3.2 2.3 1.8 
 Italy 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.0 0.9 
 Netherlands 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 
 Country % % % % % % % % % % 
 Spain 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7 
 UK 3.5 3.2 3.5 3.2 2.6 1.8 3.2 2.6 1.8 1.3 
Rest-
OECD  2.5 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.6 3.3 2.6 3.0 3.8 3.9 
 Mexico 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.5 
 Turkey 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.2 
BRIC   19 19 20 19 20 23 19 21 26 27 
 Brazil 4.4 4.7 4.4 4.7 4.9 4.9 4.7 4.6 3.8 3.2 
 China 10.8 10.8 11.6 10.8 11.2 13.5 10.8 12.7 15.1 14.8 
 India 3.8 3.7 3.9 3.7 3.8 4.9 3.7 4.2 7.0 9.4 
OPEC  7.6 7.9 7.8 7.9 8.2 9.7 7.9 8.9 11.5 11.9 
 Indonesia 3.7 3.6 3.8 3.6 3.6 4.1 3.6 3.5 2.9 2.4 
 Nigeria 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.1 0.8 1.0 2.0 2.8 
 Venezuela 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.1 0.8 
AOSIS  1.2 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.6 
LDCs  4.6 4.7 4.8 4.7 4.5 5.1 4.7 4.8 5.6 8.2 
Rest 
World  12.7 13.3 12.9 13.3 14.0 14.9 13.3 13.9 15.6 13.9 
 Argentina 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 
 
South Af-
rica 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.4 2.1 
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Table I.1. Cont’d. 
  Sectors Full vs. limited responsibility Indicator 
Cases  
All 
incl. 
LULU-
CF 
(REF) 
All 
excl. 
LULU-
CF 
CO2 all 
incl. 
LULU-
CF 
CO2 
energy 
indus-
try 
Full 
respon-
sibility 
Limited 
respon-
sibility 
Emis-
sions 
Popula-
tion GDP 
UN 
scale 
of as-
sess-
ment 
2007-
2009 
 Country % % % % % % % % % % 
Annex I  53 63 58 74 55 59 48 20 57 86 
Non-Annex I  47 37 42 26 45 41 52 80 43 14 
Annex I  53 63 58 74 55 59 48 20 57 86 
 Australia 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.5 1.7 1.9 0.3 1.1 1.8 
 Canada 2.2 2.1 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.5 2.2 0.5 1.8 3.0 
 Japan 2.8 3.2 3.6 4.5 2.9 2.9 4.0 2.0 6.7 16.6 
 
New Zea-
land 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 
 Russia 7.0 7.4 7.1 7.7 6.6 7.1 5.5 2.2 2.5 1.2 
 Ukraine 1.8 2.2 1.7 2.3 1.7 1.7 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.0 
 USA 18.7 23.7 20.9 29.2 19.6 22.3 18.0 4.6 20.7 22 
 EU-25 18 21 19 26 19 20 14 8 22 39 
 EU-15 14 17 15 20 15 16 11 6 20 37 
 France 2.1 2.5 2.1 2.8 2.2 2.4 1.3 0.9 3.1 6.3 
 Germany 3.8 4.6 4.3 5.8 4.0 4.3 2.8 1.3 4.1 8.6 
 Italy 1.2 1.5 1.3 1.8 1.3 1.2 1.5 0.9 2.9 5.1 
 Netherlands 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.3 0.9 1.9 
 Spain 0.7 0.9 0.7 1.0 0.8 0.7 1.2 0.7 2.0 3.0 
 UK 3.2 4.0 3.7 5.0 3.5 3.9 1.8 0.9 3.4 6.6 
Rest-OECD  2.6 2.2 2.8 2.3 2.5 2.4 3.9 3.5 4.6 4.8 
 Mexico 1.3 1.0 1.4 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.6 1.8 2.3 
 Turkey 0.7 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.0 0.4 
BRIC   19 17 16 11 19 14 23 41 22 23 
 Brazil 4.7 2.5 4.3 0.8 4.4 4.7 3.6 2.9 2.6 0.9 
 China 10.8 10.4 9.3 8.1 10.8 7.9 16.3 20.3 13.7 2.7 
 India 3.7 4.0 2.3 2.3 3.8 1.1 3.6 17.4 5.9 0.5 
OPEC  7.9 5.0 8.4 4.2 7.6 7.5 10.0 9.0 4.4 2.1 
 Indonesia 3.6 0.9 4.4 0.5 3.7 3.7 4.1 3.5 1.4 0.2 
 Nigeria 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.8 2.1 0.2 0.0 
 Venezuela 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.2 
AOSIS  1.2 1.0 1.1 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.2 0.8 0.6 0.6 
LDCs  4.7 2.7 3.7 0.3 4.6 3.7 3.5 11.5 1.7 0.1 
Rest World  13.3 11.5 12.3 8.8 12.7 12.1 11.9 17.9 11.6 5.0 
 Argentina 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.3 
 South Africa 0.9 2.2 2.3 2.4 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.3 
 
